Pennsylvania

The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA) has long been a cornerstone of protection for firearms manufacturers and sellers, shielding them from liability when their products are misused in crimes. But recent litigation, including the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc.,1 shows how litigants continue to test the boundaries of this federal law. While the ruling ultimately upheld the PLCAA’s protections, the case is a reminder of the ongoing scrutiny the law faces—and why it remains essential for the firearms industry.

Not everything stamped “privileged” is safe from prying eyes. The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently ruled that interview notes compiled by a sorority’s leadership after a tragic incident were not shielded by attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine. This decision serves as a cautionary tale for lawyers and their clients on how privilege works—and when it does not. See King v. Alpha Sigma Tau Sorority et al., 2025 PA Super 8, No. 55 MDA 2024 (Pa. Super 2025).

Released yearly in December, the American Tort Reform (ATR) Foundation publishes its annual “Judicial Hellhole” rankings for the upcoming year. The Hellholes represent the worst of the worst jurisdictions to defend tort lawsuits in the United States. The 2024-2025 Judicial Hellhole rankings crown a new #1 Judicial Hellhole (thanks in large part to a 10-figure nuclear verdict that sealed the crown) and also welcome a new member (King County, Washington) to the ranks.

Philadelphia County has long been a preferred forum for plaintiffs’ bar in Pennsylvania. Until last week, a motion to dismiss for improper venue under Pa. R. Civ. P. 1028(a)(1) was a tool at the disposal of any corporate defendant improperly entangled into Philadelphia County litigation. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Hangey v. Husqvarna, 14 EAP 2022 (Pa. Nov. 22, 2023, Dougherty, J.) may have effectively foreclosed improper venue dismissal except for those defendants who conduct no business in Philadelphia County whatsoever.

We previously blogged on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Mallory v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co., Civ. A. No. 3 EAP 2021, Slip. Op. J-49-2021 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2021),  which put an end to general jurisdiction based solely on registration to do business in the Commonwealth.  Since the issuance of this landscape-shifting decision, courts in the Commonwealth have seen a flurry of ”Mallory motions” coming in all shapes and sizes. So far, plaintiff’s response has been uniform – Mallory’s holding is limited and does not apply to defendants whose dealings are entirely “interstate” and who have no “footprint” in the Commonwealth. This attempt to minimize the impact of Mallory was recently rejected by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in Emery v. U.S. Steel Corp. giving a glimpse of hope to foreign defendants haled to court in Pennsylvania.

On December 22, 2021, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued a decision in Mallory v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co., Civ. A. No. 3 EAP 2021, Slip. Op. J-49-2021, at 33, 44 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2021) that is sure to become the pillar of jurisdictional challenges going forward. The Court unanimously held that general jurisdiction does not exist solely on the basis of a company’s registration to do business in Pennsylvania.

On September 27, 2021, after 18 days of trial and a mere hour of deliberations, a City of St. Louis, Missouri jury rendered a defense verdict in favor of Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”) on claims of three women diagnosed with ovarian cancer. Forrest v. Johnson & Johnson, et al., No. 1522-CC00419-02 (Mo. Cir. Ct., St. Louis Cty.). Notably, in 2018, a City of St. Louis jury returned a staggering $4.7 billion verdict in favor of 22 woman who claimed that J&J’s asbestos-contaminated talcum powder caused their ovarian cancer. 

On July 7, 2021, U.S. District Court Judge Eduardo C. Robreno, who oversees the asbestos multi district litigation (MDL 875) in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, applied a new standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019) in granting summary judgment for two turbine defendants accused of causing the decedent’s asbestos-related disease. Defendants General Electric (GE) and CBS Corporation (CBS) allegedly incorporated asbestos-containing components on their products to which the decedent was later exposed.

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Sullivan v. A. W. Chesterton, Inc., et al., No. 18-3622 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2019), grappled with the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statutes, 15 Pa.C.S. § 411 and 42 Pa.C.S. § 5301, (the “PA Statutory Scheme”) requiring out-of-state businesses to register in the state, which in turn functions as consent to general jurisdiction. This issue became salient only in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (holding corporation is “at home” only where it is incorporated or maintains its principal place of business). The Eastern District held that the PA Statutory Scheme requiring out-of-state corporations to register before they conduct business in the state and thereby consent to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania offends the Due Process Clause and is unconstitutional.

The proverbial hacksaw inside a prisoner’s birthday cake has been supplanted by a new technological trend for bringing contraband into the jailhouse – Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“UAS”). As early as 2015, a fight broke out at the Mansfield Correctional Institution in Ohio when a drone carrying tobacco, marijuana, and heroin crashed into a yard inside the facility. That same year, a drone trafficking hacksaw blades, a cellphone, and Super Glue crashed into a maximum security prison in Oklahoma. Similar plots have been attempted in more than a dozen states nationwide, leading states like North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas to ban drone flights over correctional facilities. Perhaps to save us from another pre-emption fight over UAS operational restrictions, the federal government is now following suit.