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In September 2025, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court tackled a significant procedural issue: whether an order compelling arbitration in ongoing litigation is immediately appealable as a collateral order. In Chilutti v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the plaintiffs, Shannon and Keith Chilutti, sued Uber and others for injuries allegedly sustained during a ride in a wheelchair-accessible Uber vehicle. Uber responded by invoking the arbitration clause in its user agreement and successfully petitioned the trial court to compel arbitration, staying the litigation. The Chiluttis appealed, and the Superior Court ruled in their favor, holding that the Order at issue qualified as an appealable collateral order because postponing review “may” result in irreparable loss to the Chiluttis’ claims. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that such an order does not constitute an immediately appealable collateral order and the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary. This holding has broad implications, ensuring that litigation will generally proceed to a final judgment before appellate review of arbitration enforcement, preventing a flood of immediate appeals that could bog down the courts and increase costs for business defendants.

Plaintiffs’ Argument

The Chiluttis contend that the trial court’s order compelling arbitration should be treated as a collateral order under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313. Specifically, they rely on the decision in Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corporation, 905 A.2d 422
(Pa. 2006), holding a party’s “substantial loss” of money in litigating a complex claim was sufficient to meet the third prong of the collateral order doctrine, i.e.,irreparability. The Chilutti’s argued their situation is analogous, as litigating this action in arbitration would cause a substantial loss of money and therefore, the trial court’s order compelling arbitration also meets the requirements of the third prong of the collateral order doctrine.  The Chiluttis further asserted that the arbitration agreement presented by Uber did not provide sufficient notice or constitute a knowing waiver of their jury trial rights; therefore, there was no valid agreement to arbitrate.  Further, postponing review until after a final judgment would deprive them of their constitutional right to a jury trial.

Defendant’s Argument

Uber argued that the Order compelling arbitration was not a final order and did not meet the strict requirements for collateral order appealability. Uber emphasized that under both Pennsylvania law and the Federal Arbitration Act, questions about the enforceability of arbitration agreements should be reviewed only after a final judgment, not through interlocutory appeals. Uber also pointed out that the limited standard of review for arbitration under Pennsylvania law applies only to the awards themselves, not to the trial court’s threshold decision to compel arbitration.

The Court’s Holding

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sided with Uber, holding that the trial court’s order compelling arbitration and staying litigation does not constitute an immediately appealable collateral order. The Court emphasized that the collateral order doctrine must be narrowly construed and that each of its three prongs must be clearly satisfied. The focus of the decision was on the third prong—irreparable loss. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs’ would retain the ability to challenge the arbitration order after final judgment, which did not deprive them of a review.  Further, the Court rejected the argument that potential litigation costs satisfy the irreparability requirement, noting that if litigation costs alone were enough to justify an interlocutory appeal, then every interlocutory order could satisfy the exception requirement under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313, effectively eliminating the rule. The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and instructed it to quash the appeal.

Implications

In sum, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that orders compelling arbitration are not immediately appealable as collateral orders. While the Supreme Court did not rule on other lingering questions, like whether Uber’s wrap around arbitration clause was enforceable, the decision is a net positive. Had the Court ruled otherwise, every decision compelling arbitration could have triggered an immediate appeal, leading to substantial delays, increased litigation costs, and court congestion. By requiring parties to wait until a final judgment before appealing such orders, the Court’s decision promotes judicial efficiency and reduces the risk of strategic, piecemeal appeals. For business defendants, this means less risk of prolonged litigation over arbitration clauses; for plaintiffs, it underscores the importance of raising all relevant arguments at the trial court level and being prepared to challenge arbitration orders only after the conclusion of arbitration and entry of final judgment.

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Photo of Kristen Durant Kristen Durant

Having completed a curriculum in alternative dispute resolution (ADR), Kristen is adept at finding early and efficient options for challenging and resolving disputes. Kristen advocates for clients in asbestos litigation matters and has extensive deposition and courtroom experience concerning automotive and transportation products…

Having completed a curriculum in alternative dispute resolution (ADR), Kristen is adept at finding early and efficient options for challenging and resolving disputes. Kristen advocates for clients in asbestos litigation matters and has extensive deposition and courtroom experience concerning automotive and transportation products, along with industrial equipment. She is a skilled litigator and fierce protector of clients’ interests.

Photo of Malea Casillas Malea Casillas

Malea decided to pursue a legal career after a college “Sociology of Law” course led her to see the law as a way to engage in complex problem-solving and make a tangible difference in the world. As a summer associate at Husch Blackwell…

Malea decided to pursue a legal career after a college “Sociology of Law” course led her to see the law as a way to engage in complex problem-solving and make a tangible difference in the world. As a summer associate at Husch Blackwell, she was drawn to the Mass Tort & Product Liability practice area after working with attorneys on the team. The complexity of the issues and the high stakes involved in these cases appealed to her desire for challenge and her ambition to achieve success for clients in litigation.

Malea’s background in basketball and musical theater has instilled in her a love for competition and performance—elements that are central to her work as a litigator. During law school, she also saw the importance of excellent advocacy firsthand when she participated in her university’s Child Advocacy Institute. The experience also reinforced her commitment to pro bono work. As a summer associate, Malea had the opportunity to contribute to litigation directly, drafting various pre-trial motions and observing a high-profile asbestos civil jury trial.

Malea is known as reliable, proactive, and dedicated to clients’ goals. She brings a tenacious and disciplined approach to her work, and clients can expect her to consistently strive to protect their interests.