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On January 24, 2025, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its long-awaited decision in Martin v. Goodrich Corp., upholding the constitutionality of a 2019 amendment to the Illinois Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (the “Act”).1 This decision confirms that Plaintiffs can indeed file civil claims after the 25-year statute of repose period for asbestos claims under Workers’ Compensation has expired. This decision will have a far-reaching impact throughout toxic tort litigation as it allows employees to pursue civil claims against their employers even if their Workers’ Compensation claim would otherwise be barred.

Background

The Act provides a framework for employees filing workers’ compensation claims. In Illinois, employees can receive compensation for work-related illnesses and diseases arising out of and in the course of employment. However, an employee’s ability to seek compensation outside the statute is limited. The Act includes two exclusivity provisions that outline the terms of these limitations: (1) workers cannot pursue other legal claims for compensation or damages against their employer, insurer, or agents outside of what is provided under the Act and (2) the compensation provided under the Act is the only remedy available for work-related injuries or diseases, and workers cannot pursue additional civil claims against their employer for those injuries.2 Employees are also required to seek compensation within 25 years after their alleged exposure.3 Recent legislative changes and lawsuits, however, have attempted to change this well-established framework.

In Martin v. Goodrich Corporation, et al., 2025 IL 130509, Rodney Martin alleged he was exposed to vinyl chloride while working for B.F. Goodrich from 1966 to 2012. He was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver in 2019 and passed away in 2020. In 2021, his widow filed a civil lawsuit (and not a worker’s compensation claim) invoking section 1.1 of the Act which serves to bypass its exclusivity provisions. Goodrich moved to dismiss, arguing that section 1(f) of the Act, which requires an employee to seek compensation within 25 years of their alleged exposure, was not a statute of repose and that applying the exception violated its due process rights. The District Court denied the motion, and the case was certified for appeal to the Seventh Circuit.

The Seventh Circuit then certified three questions to the Illinois Supreme Court under Rule 20. Those three questions were:

(1) whether section 1(f) of the Act is a statute of repose for purposes of section 1.1;
(2) if section 1(f) falls within section 1.1 exception, what is the temporal reach of section 1.1, either under its own terms or through section 4 of the Statute on Statutes; and
(3) whether applying section 1.1 prospectively violates Illinois’ guarantee of due process.

These questions needed to be answered due to inconsistencies between the Illinois Supreme Court’s previous decision in Folta v. Ferro Engineering4 and subsequent appellate rulings as well as the later addition of Section 1.1 of the Act. In its 2015 decision in Folta, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether the statute of repose in the Act barred claims for work-related injuries if the exposure occurred many years later. The Court ruled that once the repose period expired, the right to file a claim was terminated, even if the disease manifested years after the exposure. This reinforced the idea that the statute of repose, like a statute of limitations, limits the time a claim can be filed. In response to the Folta decision, the Illinois legislature enacted section 1.1 to mitigate the harsh impact of the statute of repose. This amendment allows claims involving injury or death of an employee that would otherwise be barred by the repose period, to be filed in civil actions.5

  1. Section 1(f) of the Act Is a Period of Repose

      Section 1(f) provides a definitive 25-year period for employees to seek compensation for asbestos-related diseases under the Act. Compensation is not possible under section 1(f) unless an employee has an occupational disease within the applicable period of time. Thus, the decision of whether section 1(f)’s time period is a statute of repose—which would bar compensation under the Act—determines whether employees can utilize the newly amended section 1.1 to bypass section 1(f) and seek compensation through a civil claim for injury or death resulting from an occupational disease that is otherwise time-barred. If section 1(f) is not a statute of repose, such claims would fall outside the scope of section 1.1 and be entirely barred.

      The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the time period referenced in section 1(f) serves as a statute of repose because it bars compensation after a defined period of time regardless of whether a claim has accrued or injury has resulted. Put differently, the time runs whether the employee has discovered the injury or been diagnosed with a disease. As such, barring any compensation by application of section 1(f) effectively extinguishes an employee’s right to file a claim under the statute. Therefore, the Court found, by its plain language, that section 1(f) is a statute of repose.

      Notably, the Court recognized Defendants’ arguments that finding section 1(f) as a statute of repose would “eviscerate the well-balanced framework” of the Act and allow employees or their heirs to bypass the exclusivity provisions if their claim is barred under section 1(f) but not other sections of the Act. However, the Court ultimately held that the legislative intent was to ensure that employees like the one in Folta were able to seek compensation even if they did not discover their injury within the time limits provided under the Act.

      1. Section 1(f) Falls Within Section 1.1’s Exception and Applies to Claims Prospectively

          Having concluded that section 1(f) is a statute of repose and thus covered under section 1.1 of the Act, the Court determined the temporal reach of section 1.1 and whether the amendment should be applied to claims retroactively or prospectively. According to section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, procedural changes are retroactive and substantive changes are prospective. Section 1.1 changed the statutory framework to allow employees who could not seek compensation under the Act due to the statutes of repose to seek compensation through civil actions. This was a substantive change, as it gave employees the ability to seek compensation outside the Act for work-related injuries that are otherwise covered under the statute. As a result, the Court ruled that section 1.1 must be applied prospectively.

          1. Section 1.1 Does Not Violate Illinois’ Due Process Guarantee

          The Court considered whether applying section 1.1 prospectively would deprive employers of a vested right to invoke an exclusivity defense under the Act, thereby violating Illinois’ due process protections. The Court gave a nod to defendants’ argument and noted that a due process claim would have been meritorious had the legislature amended the Act to revive Mr. Martin’s claim and allow for compensation under the Act. However, section 1.1 did not revive Mr. Martin’s right to compensation under the Act but rather allowed him and his heirs to pursue compensation through a civil action.

          The Court also clarified that the exclusivity provisions under the Act are affirmative—not automatic—defenses, meaning any right to said defenses accrues when an employee discovers their injury. In this case, since Mr. Martin’s diagnosis and complaint occurred after section 1.1’s enactment, the Court held that defendants had no vested right to assert the exclusivity defense and applying section 1.1 prospectively would allow claims such as Mr. Martin’s to proceed without violating due process.

          Analysis

          Employers defending occupational disease claims in Illinois can expect significant changes as a result of the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in Martin. Now that the Court has clarified section 1(f) as a statute of repose, employees with latent occupational diseases, such as those caused by asbestos exposure, have a new path to pursue civil claims against their employers even if their workers’ compensation claims are otherwise barred by the 25-year repose period. As a result, employers can anticipate a rise in civil lawsuits as employees can now bypass the restrictions imposed by the Act’s exclusivity provisions.

          However, employers can successfully defend against some of these claims going forward. Section 1.1. does not revive claims that were already time-barred under previous law. Instead, section 1.1 only applies to claims prospectively, meaning employees can only take advantage of the new amendment if their claim is filed after 2019. Thus, defendants are protected from the revival of claims extinguished before the amendment. Further, employers retain the right to invoke exclusivity defenses, which accrue when the employee’s injury is discovered or when the cause of action arises. Thus, employers should be aware of the timing of an employee’s diagnosis and filing of claim.

          As changes to the workers’ compensation framework unfold, both employers and employees need to stay informed about their rights and defenses available under Illinois law. Martin marks a significant turning point, and its full implications will continue to shape the workers’ compensation landscape in Illinois.

          1. 820 ILCS 310/1 et seq. ↩︎
          2. 820 ILCS 310/5(a); 820 ILCS 310/11. ↩︎
          3. 820 ILCS 310/1(f); 820 ILCS 310/6(c). ↩︎
          4. 2015 IL 118070. ↩︎
          5. 820 ILCS 310/1.1. ↩︎