On February 11, 2026, Judge Juan R. Sánchez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to remand in a high-profile toxic torts case. Former professional baseball players and representatives of their estates filed a lawsuit, claiming that extended exposure to per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”) while playing for a team that used artificial turf in its stadium led to the development of various cancers. Plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s removal was untimely, as it was filed 175 days after service of the original complaint, and also claimed the federal contractor defense lacked adequate evidence.

Senate Bill 293 (SB 293), codified at Section 23.303 of the Texas Government Code, requires Texas courts to follow a strict schedule for hearings and rulings on motions for summary judgment. Effective September 1, 2025, SB 293 aims to streamline judicial efficiency and provide Texas litigants with more predictability. Relatedly, Texas House Bill 16 (HB 16), effective December 4, 2025, modifies the timelines for judicial action initially set by SB 293 in two ways:

1) by increasing the time courts have to consider motions for summary judgment from 45 days after the motion is filed to 60 days; and

2) by allowing courts up to 90 days after a summary judgment motion is filed to consider it, but only under very limited circumstances. Motions for summary judgment filed between September 1, 2025 and December 3, 2025 are subject to the deadlines originally introduced by SB 293.

In September 2025, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court tackled a significant procedural issue: whether an order compelling arbitration in ongoing litigation is immediately appealable as a collateral order. In Chilutti v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the plaintiffs, Shannon and Keith Chilutti, sued Uber and others for injuries allegedly sustained during a ride in a wheelchair-accessible Uber vehicle. Uber responded by invoking the arbitration clause in its user agreement and successfully petitioned the trial court to compel arbitration, staying the litigation. The Chiluttis appealed, and the Superior Court ruled in their favor, holding that the Order at issue qualified as an appealable collateral order because postponing review “may” result in irreparable loss to the Chiluttis’ claims. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that such an order does not constitute an immediately appealable collateral order and the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary. This holding has broad implications, ensuring that litigation will generally proceed to a final judgment before appellate review of arbitration enforcement, preventing a flood of immediate appeals that could bog down the courts and increase costs for business defendants.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated a $1 billion jury verdict in favor of a plaintiff who alleged injuries arising out of a 2017 car accident. The case centered on alleged defects in a 1992 sports car’s occupant restraint system and roof design. The analysis from the Superior Court, while non-precedential, offers crucial insights into Pennsylvania’s product liability law particularly with regard to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s landmark Tincher opinion.

Themis, Greek goddess of justice, holding scales in front of a courthouse

The proper allocation of the burden of proof during closing arguments is a recurring issue in civil litigation. On August 19, 2025, the Illinois First District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant a new trial in Harrell v. City of Chicago, offering important guidance regarding improper burden shifting during closing arguments. 2025 IL App (1st) 240119, ¶ 83. The ruling makes clear that while parties may highlight unrebutted evidence, only defendants may highlight when an expert was not retained to rebut or prove a specific element of the case.

On December 2, 2025, Bayer announced that the Solicitor General of the United States,
D. John Sauer1 has recommended the United States Supreme Court take up the Monsanto Co. v. Durnell2 appeal on the Roundup product litigation. The Supreme Court previously invited the Solicitor General to weigh in on the views of the United States.3 In response, Mr. Sauer’s office authored their own petition for a writ of certiorari, agreeing with Monsanto Company (“Monsanto”)’s arguments that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”)4 preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims concerning Roundup.

Each year, thousands of individuals are severely injured or die from intentional inhalation of everyday products like computer duster to achieve a euphoric high. When these injuries or deaths lead to lawsuits against manufacturers, plaintiffs often argue that the products were defectively designed or inadequately warned. A recent Tenth Circuit decision reinforces a critical limit on such claims under Kansas law: when the plaintiff’s own criminal conduct is the proximate cause of the harm, recovery is barred.

In August 2025, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to exclude an expert’s causation opinion as unreliable and grant summary judgment in favor of a herbicide manufacturer. The case, which arose from claims that exposure to an herbicide caused the plaintiff’s blood cancer, underscores the critical importance of rigorous and well-supported expert analysis in toxic tort litigation and the judiciary’s gatekeeping role under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.1

In a significant development concerning Minnesota’s environmental regulations, an administrative court rejected the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency’s (MPCA) proposed rule on per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) reporting and associated fees.1 This decision, issued on
August 29, 2025, highlights procedural and substantive criteria considered in the MPCA’s rulemaking process.2

Introduction

On October 6, 2025, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Syngenta Crop, LLC v. Nemeth, passing on an opportunity to clarify its prior decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern and address whether Pennsylvania’s “consent to jurisdiction” statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The result: for now, out-of-state corporations registered to do business in Pennsylvania remain subject to general personal jurisdiction in the Commonwealth, regardless of the extent of their in-state operations.