Introduction

On October 6, 2025, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Syngenta Crop, LLC v. Nemeth, passing on an opportunity to clarify its prior decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern and address whether Pennsylvania’s “consent to jurisdiction” statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The result: for now, out-of-state corporations registered to do business in Pennsylvania remain subject to general personal jurisdiction in the Commonwealth, regardless of the extent of their in-state operations.

Brief Background: Mallory v. Norfolk Southern

The roots of this issue trace to the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. 122 (2023). As we outlined in the Product Perspective, the Mallory  Court vacated a Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruling and held that Pennsylvania’s statute—requiring out-of-state corporations to consent to general personal jurisdiction as a condition of doing business—did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court relied on its earlier precedent in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Min. & Mill. Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917), reaffirming that registration-based consent can satisfy due process.

However, the Mallory decision left significant questions unresolved. Most notably, in his concurrence, Justice Alito emphasized that the Commerce Clause presents a separate—and potentially dispositive—issue. He observed that “the Constitution restricts a State’s power to reach out and regulate conduct that has little if any connection with the State’s legitimate interests,” and suggested that Pennsylvania’s scheme might “discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not addressed this argument, leaving the door open for future challenges.

The Syngenta Petition: Commerce Clause Front and Center

Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC and Syngenta AG (“Syngenta”) accepted Justice Alito’s invitation. After being subjected to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania  under the same consent statute—despite allegedly having no substantial operations in the state—Syngenta sought the Supreme Court’s review. Their petition for a writ of certiorari presented four principal arguments:

1. Mallory Did Not Resolve the Federalism and Fairness Questions

Syngenta argued that their case squarely presented the “federalism and fairness concerns” highlighted in Mallory. They quoted Justice Alito’s concurrence: “the Constitution restricts a State’s power to reach out and regulate conduct that has little if any connection with the State’s legitimate interests.” (Mallory, 600 U.S. at 154.) Unlike Norfolk Southern, which, according to SCOTUS, maintained “significant operations” in Pennsylvania, Syngenta’s only connection was its registration as a foreign corporation. Syngenta contended that the absence of substantial in-state operations made the Commerce Clause issue unavoidable.

2. The Dormant Commerce Clause Requires Supreme Court Guidance

Syngenta’s central argument was that Pennsylvania’s registration statute imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce. The company asserted that the law is discriminatory, exposing out-of-state corporations to broader litigation risk than Pennsylvania-based companies. Syngenta cited Davis v. Farmers’ Co-op Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923), where the Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota statute that forced carriers to defend lawsuits in distant forums, finding that such laws “impose[] upon interstate commerce a serious and unreasonable burden.”

Syngenta further warned that Pennsylvania’s approach encourages “creative corporate restructuring” to avoid registration and, therefore, general jurisdiction, referencing Simon v. First Savings Bank of Indiana, 692 F. Supp. 3d 479 (E.D. Pa. 2023), as an example of emerging avoidance strategies.

3. Due Process Remains at Issue for Nonresident Defendants

While the Supreme Court in Mallory found that registration-based consent could satisfy due process, Syngenta argued that this reasoning should not apply where a defendant has no meaningful presence in the forum state. They urged the Court to clarify that registration alone—without substantial in-state operations—should not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction consistent with due process and basic fairness.

4. Unresolved Questions Invite Forum Shopping and Legal Uncertainty

Syngenta concluded by warning that the Supreme Court’s failure to address these issues would perpetuate confusion and incentivize forum shopping. Without clear constitutional guidance, lower courts would continue to split, and parties would be left without predictable rules governing personal jurisdiction for out-of-state corporations.

The Supreme Court’s Denial: Implications and Next Steps

The Supreme Court denied Syngenta’s petition without comment. The denial leaves Pennsylvania’s consent-to-jurisdiction statute intact, at least for now. The dormant Commerce Clause challenge remains unresolved, and the business community is left to navigate a landscape marked by uncertainty and strategic risk.

Practical Implications

1. The Commerce Clause Issue Remains Unsettled

Justice Alito’s concurrence in Mallory continues to serve as an open invitation for future Commerce Clause challenges. The Supreme Court has not sanctioned Pennsylvania’s approach under the Commerce Clause; it has simply declined, for now, to address the question.

2. Forum Shopping Will Persist

Pennsylvania’s statute continues to provide plaintiffs with a powerful forum-selection tool. Out-of-state corporations registered in Pennsylvania remain vulnerable to general jurisdiction for claims with little or no connection to the state. This dynamic is likely to encourage further forum shopping and strategic litigation.

3. Expect Continued Litigation and Divergent Lower Court Rulings

With no Supreme Court guidance, lower courts will likely continue to reach inconsistent results. As more states consider similar statutes or as more challenges arise, the likelihood of a circuit split—and eventual Supreme Court intervention—grows.

4. Consider Registration and Compliance Strategies

Corporations registered to do business in Pennsylvania (or other states with similar statutes) should carefully assess the litigation risks inherent in such registration. Counsel should evaluate whether registration is necessary and advise on potential restructuring or risk-mitigation strategies. In-house and outside counsel should also monitor developments in other jurisdictions, as the Commerce Clause issue is likely to surface again.

5. The Legal Landscape Remains Fluid

Syngenta’s arguments are now part of the public record, and other companies are likely to raise similar Commerce Clause and due process challenges. The business community should remain alert for the next case that may prompt Supreme Court review.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s refusal to review Syngenta’s Commerce Clause challenge leaves the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s consent-to-jurisdiction statute unresolved. For now, registration as a foreign corporation in Pennsylvania continues to carry the risk of general personal jurisdiction in the nation’s No. 1 Judicial Hellhole, regardless of the company’s actual in-state activity. The dormant Commerce Clause question remains open, and the potential for further litigation—and eventual Supreme Court review—remains high.

Counsel advising national clients should continue to monitor these developments and proactively assess the risks associated with registration statutes in Pennsylvania and beyond. The boundaries of personal jurisdiction, federalism, and interstate commerce remain in flux, and the stakes for corporate defendants are significant.