Toxic Torts

The Iowa Court of Appeals recently affirmed summary judgment for both a premises owner and an installer of asbestos products pursuant to Iowa Code 686B.7(5) (2017), which provides that a defendant in an asbestos action “shall not be liable for exposures from a product or component part made or sold by a third party.”  Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc., No. 19-1852, slip op. (Iowa Ct. App. March 17, 2021).  The Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of Mr. Beverage, who worked as an independent contractor at an Alcoa aluminum plant around asbestos-containing insulation installed by IITI.  Alcoa and IITI, the only two defendants, filed motions for summary judgment claiming that Section 686B.7(5) provided them with immunity from Plaintiffs’ lawsuit.  The district court granted both Alcoa and IITI’s motions for summary judgment.  On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in granting immunity to Alcoa and IITI by incorrectly interpreting Section 686B.7(5).

Illinois Governor Pritzker signed into law Senate Bill 72 (SB 72), which includes prejudgment interest and amends the Illinois Interest on Judgment Act 735 ILCS 2-1303 (Act). The amendment imposes six-percent prejudgment interest on economic and noneconomic damages in personal injury and wrongful death cases. Prior to SB 72’s passing, Illinois generally only recognized post-judgment interest at nine-percent per annum, running from when the judgment was made to the time it was satisfied. Personal injury plaintiffs generally could not recover losses incurred before judgment, but will be able to following SB 72’s effective date on July 1, 2021.

HB 3360, vetoed by Gov. Pritzker on March 25, would have imposed 9 percent prejudgment interest on personal injury and wrongful death claims in Illinois. This is the governor’s first bill rejection in two years and his ninth veto since taking office.

HB 3360’s pathway to Gov. Pritzker’s desk was unusual: it was passed quickly and quietly during the Illinois legislature’s January lame duck session, where lawmakers worked through the night to get the bill finalized. The governor was expected to sign the bill as soon as it passed, but, surprisingly, a wait ensued after it reached his desk, suggesting that the bill would require some work. See our prior analysis of HB 3360’s provisions.

All legal practitioners should be familiar with the concept of personal jurisdiction and its two subsets: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction; both of which are juxtaposed with the inalienable Due Process Clause which effectively and simultaneously restricts a given court’s authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. It is no surprise that civil litigators are trained to instantly analyze and determine where a defendant corporation is headquartered and incorporated to ascertain whether a particular court maintains general jurisdiction. A substantial amount of time in contemplation is involved when analyzing the “sufficient minimum contacts” needed to advance specific jurisdiction arguments, or whether claims alleged “arise out of or even relate to” those minimum contacts in the first place.

The Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in Carolyn Coffman et al v. Armstrong International, Inc., et al., at least implicitly, recognized a “bare metal defense” for the first time under Tennessee law. The Court addressed the issue of whether, under Tennessee law, equipment defendants “had a duty to warn of the dangers associated with the post-sale integration of asbestos-containing materials manufactured and sold by others.” The Court held that, under the Tennessee Products Liability Act (TPLA), Tenn. Code Ann. §29-28-101 through 108, the equipment defendants did not have a duty to warn end users about the post-sale incorporation of asbestos containing products manufactured by third parties.

The Illinois Supreme Court recently held that an increased risk of future harm is not an injury; tossing a class action suit which sought damages related to the City of Chicago’s replacement of water meters and water main pipes. The named Plaintiffs had filed the case on behalf of all Chicago residents who had water mains or meters replaced or installed between January 2008 and January 2017. The suit alleged negligence and inverse condemnation against the City of Chicago.

In a fact-intensive decision issued on October 22, 2020, the Illinois Supreme Court determined in Sergiu Tabirta v. James J. Cummings, et al. that the mere presence of an employee’s home office in Cook County was insufficient, by itself, to establish proper venue over his employer in the jurisdiction. Merely having an employee with a home office in the venue was insufficient under the circumstances to constitute “doing business” or maintaining an “other office” there to satisfy the requirements of Illinois’ venue statute.

On January 13, 2021, the Illinois General Assembly passed House Bill 3360 (Bill) which, if signed by Governor Pritzker, would impose a 9 percent per annum prejudgment interest rate in wrongful death and personal injury tort actions. Illinois law does not currently recognize prejudgment interest in such tort actions, only allowing a post-judgment interest rate of 9 percent per annum running from the date of the judgment’s entry through the date of satisfaction. 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(a). While 5 percent prejudgment interest is permitted in certain cases where liability is clear and damages are readily ascertainable, such interest has never been permitted in personal injury cases, as damages are too difficult to calculate in advance.

On August 24, 2020 in Ann Finch v. Covil Corp., 972 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a North Carolina federal district court’s decision, sustaining a $32.7 million verdict in favor of  the plaintiff in an asbestos-related wrongful death lawsuit against insulation contractor Covil Corporation. On appeal, Covil argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury as to proximate cause and refused to reduce the damages award, however the three-judge panel found no fault with the district court’s jury instructions or its rationale for refusing to reduce the jury verdict.