On February 11, 2026, Judge Juan R. Sánchez of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to remand in a high-profile toxic torts case. Former professional baseball players and representatives of their estates filed a lawsuit, claiming that extended exposure to per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS”) while playing for a team that used artificial turf in its stadium led to the development of various cancers. Plaintiffs argued that the defendant’s removal was untimely, as it was filed 175 days after service of the original complaint, and also claimed the federal contractor defense lacked adequate evidence.
Procedural Background
A product defendant removed the case pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the federal officer removal statute, contending that certain PFAS at issue in the plaintiff’s claims were introduced through the use, storage, or disposal of aqueous film-forming foam (“AFFF”) containing PFAS, which was manufactured for and sold to the U.S. Military in compliance with its rigorous specifications. The defendant argued that there was a direct link between the plaintiffs’ claims and federal conduct, since the plaintiffs’ exposure to PFAS plausibly resulted from the defendant’s military-grade AFFF contaminating their hometowns and workplaces.
Governing Standard
To remove a case under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant must demonstrate that it: (1) is a person within the meaning of the statute; (2) the defendant acted under the direction of a federal officer; (3) the plaintiff’s claims are “for or relating” to acts taken under the color of federal office; and (4) the defendant has raised a colorable federal defense.1 At issue here was also the federal contractor defense, which applies against product liability claims where: (a) the government approved reasonably precise specifications, (b) the product conformed to those specifications, and (c) the government knew of the relevant hazards.2
Removal Analysis
The court concluded that the removal was timely because the plaintiffs’ complaint made no mention of exposure to AFFF, military firefighting foam, military installations, or drinking water contamination, and thus the thirty-day clock was never triggered. The defendant seeking removal also met all the necessary requirements for the process. The defendant, as a corporation, qualified as a person, and the defendant’s manufacturing of a military-compliant AFFF product satisfied the “acting under” federal direction element. The third element was satisfied because the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs’ PFAS exposure could have been the result of water contamination in cities where the players lived and worked, and the water contamination was allegedly caused by AFFF manufactured for the military. The court highlighted that at the removal stage, a federal defense only needs to be plausible—not guaranteed to succeed—since the actual strength or likelihood of success of the defendant’s theory isn’t being evaluated yet. Finally, the defendant raised a credible federal contractor defense, claiming that it produced PFAS-containing AFFF according to specifications approved by the U.S. military, that its AFFF met those specifications, and that the military was aware of potential hazards but continued to purchase and use the products. Therefore, the court denied the motion to remand, finding that Defendant’s removal was timely and proper.
Impact and Takeaways
The court’s denial of remand is a significant procedural win for a defendant in toxic tort litigation and emphasizes the importance of investigating alternative exposure theories. Here, the plaintiffs’ remand motion unsuccessfully asserted that the defendant’s exposure theory was too speculative and attenuated as it lacked evidentiary support, affidavits, documents, and facts supporting its claim that the plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by drinking water contaminated by AFFF. The plaintiffs also unsuccessfully argued that their complaints made no allegation or reference to AFFF exposure, attempting to limit the defendant’s ability to remove under § 1442 to the exposure theories alleged by a plaintiff. The court emphasized that § 1442 was an exception to the well pleaded complaint rule, so it did not matter that the plaintiffs’ complaints omitted any AFFF allegations. Therefore, defendants in cases like this may remove based on alternative exposure theories that are not disclosed in the plaintiff’s complaint or known by the plaintiff. Moreover, the ruling underscores that the thirty-day removal window is not triggered unless the plaintiff’s filings affirmatively disclose a basis for removal, thereby preserving defendants’ ability to remove when alternative federal grounds come to light.3